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1 - v Introductioni In recent years there has been increasing concern that in the eyes 
of the poor development can be a mockery. All too often it is biased in 
favour of those who are among the better off, even when projects are * 
specifically aimed at enabling the poor to raise their standards of living. 
This can occur either deliberately, as a result of manipulations by national 
or local elites who stand to benefit, or unintentionally,'because the 
distributive Impact of the project strategy has not been fully understood 
* * 
in advance. Hence if development is to be equitable in the sense that 
the advantages derived from it are evenly spread, special attention must be 
paid to how projects are devised. •• 
I?rem this point of view much has been learnt from the experience 
of projects set up under the Kenyan Special Pojral Development Programme 
(SFiDP). The SR33P was devised to find and test innovative methods of fostering 
rural development within an integrated framework, i.e. one in which the 
projects are coordinated so as to complement one another. The basic concept 
was testing for the purpose of replication. Six areas in different Provinces 
of Kenya served as pilot areas: Administrative, technical and financial 
resources have been provided by the Kenyan government and five foreign g 
government donors. 
"Reaching the rural poor" was the outstanding objective of the 
projects under the S i
I h i s
 objective has later, been foimulated even more 
strongly as "more equitable development" set out in Kenya's Development 
Plan, for 1974 to' 1973 (see paragraph 10,2, Government of Kenya (6) within 
the ambit of which the programme has been operating. 
- i 1 • 1 * ' ' 
* The authors were involved in the Evaluation of the Kenyan 
Special Rural Development programme. 
** See Gotscli (4) for a general discussion of this problem. — """" 
***The four explicit principles have been; experimentati on
?
 - evaluation, 
replicability and use of local resources. Three ultimate objectives have 
been identified: "increased rural production and productivity, increased 
rural incomes, hence^ higher standards of living; increased rural employment 
opporturu ties and better rural life" (S.E.D.P. (14))* 
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In this paper just four out of the many aspects of the SHIP which 
might be cconsidered as being, in furtherance of this aim are examined to find 
out how they have. ..tail len short -of their objectives- ann. what can.be. done to-
• avcdcL.s imilar, failure in the-future. 
Two -of these four aspects..are ..actually .projects set up..to assist 
•small-scale.farmers, namely, (l) extension.service and (ll) credit projects*. 
A third aspect .concerns .(ill) land tenure reform, in particular the caa>-
.•yersiarL.of custanazy and often communa] land rights to., registered and. usually. 
individual . title, Fourthly, we lode at the attempt at (IV) administrative 
decentralisation which was carried out to foster local participation in the 
planning.and Implementation of development projects, 
1 
2« Agricultural Extension 
(a) Objectives and methods of agricultural extension under the Slug. 
The general agriculral extension 
s bp vie o in a Giiy s, deploys about 
10,060 full .time vforkers and officers under the Ministiy of Agri-
culture, The extension worker/farmer (households) ratio is con-
siderably below 1. to 1.000., The. basic objective of the Kenyan _.„--' 
extension service is to improve agriculture 'among the large masses -of smallholder farmers, _ .. 
\ 
Although this concept .has.no direct equity component, indirectly' 
there is. .an 'aspect of more equitable development based on the 
* j 
intention to, reach the masses of the farming population with in~ 
•• come generating...innovations and improvements. I 
h j 
Under "the. Special it-Ural Development Programme .extension was more 
directdy supposed to be an instrument of reaching the rural poor 
development--as., one basic S2DP. objective. Since the extension 
ageajt - farmer (household) ratio is above 1 to 500, .direct cccmruni-
catipn between the change agents and the farmers can be established 
.only" with a veiy minor part of the farming population. The 
) 
concept of spread or hem the diffusion process of innovations. 
can be -promoted, therefore^, is of crucial importance for stimulating 
more equitable development. 
. . \ 
\ X , x 
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Under the concept of spread the S?J2? extension' experiments can 
be categorized into three conceptual aspects: 
1, Most progressive or best fanner approach 
Channelling the spread of innovations or improvements through 
the "most progressive" or best farmers within an area. Existing 
v idols are utilised as catalysts for the diffusion of innovation 
which is expected to trie&le down the progressiveness scale 
in a snowball effect, 
2, Intensive extension or model approach 
Idols or models are created by concentrating "intensive 
extension" on a few promising farmers in a particular area. 
These built up idols or models again have the function of 
promoting the spread of innovation. 
3, less progressive or average farmer approach 
The extension service concentrates its attention directly on 
"less progressive" or average farmers expecting the spread of 
innovation among them without a time lag intrinsic for the 
first two concepts. 
How the extension concepts tend to be perverted 
Thesis 1: The most progressive or best farmer approach is theoretically 
based on a misinterpretation of the Sogers' diffusion theory 
(Rogers (ll)). This approach has the opposite effect to 
equitable development. It aggravates economic and social 
disparitiesj, It promotes dualistic economic systems in 
the process of rural development. 
Practically this approach is followed by extension workers 
for a simple reason. It is easier for them to work with the 
best farmers. 3y a certain extension effort those staff 
members can prove formally that they have been succeessful 
by reporting- the highest number of adoptions directly 
resulting from their work. 
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The misinterpretation of Sogers is based, on the assumption 
that the change agent's system of intervention has to be 
in line with the
 i;
natural" social process of diffusion. 
Innovations in the "natural" diffusion process enter ,a 
particular social unit through the "innovators" and "early 
adopters" and then spread to the "early" and "late majority" 
and finally reach the "laggards". We can simplify the 5 
adopter categories of Rogers by dychotomizing in terms of 
"most" and "less progressive". . The following hypothesis 
can be derived from the theoretical concepts of innovation 
in relation to extension: 
1, Starting promotion of agricultural innovation with most 
progressive farmers cumulates knowledge, skills and in-
come generation among few farmers at the first instance, 
2, In most rur^l developing societies there is a strong-
tendency towards social'"and economic discrepancies based 
on the very wide differences in knowledge, skills and 
opportunities. The agricultural activities of the more 
advanced section of the population tend to became inco-
mpatible with the activities of the less advanced. The 
concept of spread - although still valid - shows empirically 
a very slow and hampered trickling down of innovation -
sometimes even being blocked nearly completely, 
3, Extension focusing on the most\progressive' farmers 
tends to make their agricultural activities even more 
incompatible with the largest section of the population. 
Thus the spread of innovation is reduced, 
j 
/ 
4, Extension focusing on the "progressives" has another 
negative effect on the diffusion;: recommendations for 
agricultural improvements / technically as well as where 
the farming system _is concerned - are specific for the 
advanced farmers. .They might be inappropriate for the 
average farmers right from the beginning of'"'their introduction. 
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Extension can intervene in the "natural" diffusion process. 
Using appropriate communication techniques,adequate for the 
progressiveness stage of the target group, income generating 
agricultural innovation or improvement can be first introduced 
to everybody selected independently of his progressiveness in 
society. 
Further it is not the very advanced person who functions as 
idol for agricultural adoption. It is the person who can be 
identified with i.e. whose situation does not differ very much 
from, the one of the adopter. Only the marginally better farmers 
therefore function effectively as idols in the agricultural 
diffusion of innovation. 
If the previous two hypthesis are being accepted there is 
only one rationale in selecting farmers for. extension: viz 
the farmers who belong to the majority in their progressiveness 
stage. j 
(a) The diffusion of income generating agricultural 
innovation stimulated by the agricultural extension 
is inefficient if devised as "frontal" strategy: 
number of farmers 
(b) The diffusion of income—generating agricultural 
innovation stimulated by agricultural extension 
is more effective if devised as "lateral" stra-
njumber of farmers 
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Thesis 2: The concept of intensive.extension - concentrating all efforts 
on a few fanners (not necessarily considering their progressiveness) 
to demonstrate to the others what progress can be made in agri-
culture is theoretically inconsistent. Models function only as 
long as they are compatible with the situation of the target 
population. Intensive extension tends to haVe the same effect 
as the most progressive approach. Model farmers are being created 
"artificially" who finally function like the most progressive 
described above. 
In practice there seems to be a tendency to recruit more progressive farmers 
for building them up as models - combining two negative efforts for the 
diffusion process. 
In the Kwale SliDP where an intensive extension project was conducted the 
the selected farmers did not represent the bigger farmers in the area. An 
analysis of the land holding (Okoth-Ogendo (lo), calculated from table 3 
p.ll) shows the average lands!ae of the model farms to be 15,56 hectares 
whereas the average landholding in the area is: (source: Okoth-Ogendo (10), 
table 2 p.5, calculated from Bumbani) 
below 4 hectares 81£o 
4 - below 15 hectares 16fi 
15 and more hectares 3/£, 
(c) Methods preventing the perversion of reaching the needy farmers 
Thesis 5: The less progressive or average farmer'approach theo-
retically is the most adequate method for initiating 
accelerated diffusion of innovation. But there is a 
lack of appropriate practical extension methods. 
In the 3PLCP some extension experiments were conducted within this 
category. In a Hybrid Maize Project (Tetu 3±ffiP, 1972/73) about 800 
less progressive farmers (defined as "below average") were recruited. 
They had to undergo a 5-days training course in a farmers, training 
centre. The course was developed specifically for less progressive 
farmers. The ifybrid Maizg inputs were organized by co-operatives and 
credits were provided. The successful adoption rate was 97^. A randan 
sample of about 60 farmers showed a strong diffusion effect within the 
same season. Two to three other farmers on average adopted Hybrid Maize 
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from each of the less progressive fanners although the secondary 
adoptors had no credit facilities (further description see 
Ascroft at al. (2)). 
The first pilot projects for introducing Soya Beans in Kenya 
(Kisii and Migori SHIS?, 1974) again were oriented towards the 
less progressive (defined as average farmers). 
The technology as well as the training methods were specifically 
devised for average farmers. The adoption rate of he first 94 
farmers was IGO/j. For the second planting 1,900 farmers signed 
application forms for seeds. The applications have to be taken 
as indicator for the diffusion process since limited seed avail-
ability could not satisfy the demand for seeds. This again showed 
a very strong diffusion process (for further description see 
Sch'inheiT et al. (12)). 
The practical problems of implementing the "less progressive" 
oriented extension approach centre around the selection procedure 
of farmers for extension activities (as demonstrators, for 
training, etc.). 
1. If the recruitment of farmers is up to the judgement of exten-
sion staff there is always a tendency to select the better 
farmers even if the instructions are clearly against this, 
2. The categorisation of farmers according to progressiveness 
is difficult for an extension officer. Furthermore he lias 
no information about most farmers whatsoever. 
Facing this problem, the 3JHIP <Joveloped a procedure replacing 
subjective selection by objective methods: groups of farmers 
were chosen as neighbourhood gro'jps (as faras possible depending 
on the willingness to participate). By this simple method which 
in effect revolutionised conYenttcm&J, extension procedures, 
farmers who represented the local population
 w e
r e statistically 
chosen. Most of the participants were
 l i
a v e > ? t F u r t h e r m o r e 
the group approach, is replacing the individual. I aim 
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the first one offering a great potential for more effective 
camaunication between extension agent and farmers. 
The Simp Migori had introduced such an average farmer oriented 
group system in 1974 in the whole laigori Division, The greatest 
benefitter of this approach besides the farmers since then, has 
been the British American Tobacco Company, The tobacco extension 
was channelled through this approach in 1975 and the first heavy 
tobacco increase (and curing) - raising the number of growers 
within one season from 40 to 400 and the number of curing b a m s free 
a dozen or os to above 500 - was achieved in Kenya after many years 
of unsuccessful trials. 
Thesis 5: Perversion of the extension aims of reaching the poor 
can be avoided if farmers are recruited for extension 
activities on the basis of objective criteria (e,g. 
neighbourhood groups). 
Thesis 6; If extension services succeed in making average farmers 
\ first adopters of agricultural innovation the diffusion 
process will be much stronger than in the ''natural" 
3, Unsecured Seasonal Credit for Smallholders 
The provision of credit for 3mall-scale farmers is frequently 
suggested as a means of spreading agricultural development equitably. The 
rationale runs as follows: To raise agricultural production it is necessary 
for farmers to begin to uDe new seed types, fertilisers, insecticides and 
perhaps hire some labour saving devices such as hand-tillers, ox-ploughs 
or even tractors. These inputs can only be acquired with cash, which is just 
what small farmers lack. Banks do not find smallholders to be good risks 
and so special credit programmes should be Set up to cater for the need. 
There is much to be said for tkisr line of argument but there are-
impoa
v
fcant qualifications to it, T h ^ e were well illustrated in the project 
established in the Viliiga SxSS? (Western Province} to prtrvide fertilisers, 
insecticide and hybrid maize seed to smallholders. At first the .loan could 
only be made to farmers prepared to plant two acres ---.aize, but this limit 
was .reduced to one. As the average farm size in Vihiga is arou^ tv^ o acres 
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and the credit was granted without security, most farmers in the area were 
eligible for the loan. The inputs were provided in kind and repayment made 
in cash after the harvest. 
The first question to ask about this sort of project goes right to 
the first assumption on which such credit programmes are based, and that is 
whether all the inputs specified as necessary really are needed. The hybrid 
maize seeds are obviously indispensable but they are also a small cost item 
(less than Shs 30/- for one acre in 1975). Insecticides may be questionable 
but co3t even less. The major, and most controversial query lies against the 
fertiliser including top dressing - which in 1975cost same Shs 450/- (over 
U.S. $50) f or just one acre. 
To begin with, it is not clear that fertiliser is always as vital 
as is supposed, even for a product of the G-reen Revolution such as hybrid 
maize. Often it may be possible for a farmer to raise his yields more, by 
better husbandry practices, such as early planting, proper spacing of plants 
and efficient weeding, than by applying fertiliser, (Allan, (l)). The 
extent to which this is so clearly depends on soil conditions and prevailing 
standards of farming, but it is wrong to assume that raising yields requires 
fertiliser. To do so is to give tiriority to the costliest item first. It 
would benefit farmers more to give priority to improving the extension 
service so that they can l e a m the better husbandry. The poorest in parti-
cular would benefit if they could improve their incomes without incurring a 
burden of debt. 
A further and related point is that where soil nutrients are to 
be supplemented it is not always best to follow research statioi^. recommenda-
tions concerning the application of synthetic fertilisers. Substitutes may 
be available in the farm of. compost or manure, and even when they are not, 
chemical fertilisers should often be applied in less than the suggested 
amounts. This is because the recommendations are often based on agronomic, 
\ 
not economic optima. The price of fertiliser can triple and yet-the pre-
scription of the research station remain the sagie. Here again the importance 
is emphasised of an efficient extension service. The aim---should tobe to 
help farmers keep down their need for cash outlays, on innovations instead of 
taking them for "granted anu so posing a financial cantraiat. ThiS^aiso 
\
 ; 
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applies to inputs other than fertilisers, There is no need to encourage 
tractor hiring where ox-ploughs are available and cheaper. 
The second major question to raise concerning credit programmes of 
the Vihiga type is whether the beneficiaries are really going to be the 
poorest farmers most in need of financial help. The question is not easy 
to answer because good data on farmers' financial positions one not available 
but in Vihiga there have been indications that it was often not the case. 
In a random sample of 300 farmers it was found that larger percentages of 
farmers who had obtained loans had already begun to use hybrid maize seed 
and fertiliser- previously than was the case among farmers who did not 
receive loans, (Of loan recipients 93?j had adopted hybrid maize seed and 
76% had used fertiliser, while for farmers who did not receive the loan the 
figures were ana 36/i respectively). This result is not surprising given 
the fact that extension, services, which have much to do with the selection 
of loan recipients, so often have a progressive farmer bias. This does not 
argue against credit provision as such, but it does point to the need for 
safeguards if it is to be arrived at the neediest farmers, 
:
 A third and obvious question to ask about unsecured credit is 
whether farmers will repay. The answer is that only some of them will. 
The only eqonaraic. incentive to repay arises when a loaneee wants to establish 
a good reputation with the credit authority so as to be able to obtain 
another loan. For may farmers this motive seems to be insufficiently 
persuasiva. In Vihiga the loan repayment rate went down from 82% in 1971 
(when-there were only 63 loanees, none of whom, it was discovered, really 
needed tha credit) to 28G in 1S73 (when 920 loans were made). The. repay-
ment rate went up in 1974 after an educational campaign, but remained under 
. • What this means is that unsecured credit is an expensive way to 
help sraaj.1 scale farmers, IT or can it be considered equitable when benefits 
are distributed according to the propensity to default. Moreover, to insist 
on security by -title deed is not a financial remedy because, among other 
reasons, the cost of foreclosing is high relative to the size of the loan. 
Schemes for small,loans are only viable where the crop can only be sold 
through a particular agency and ia not locally marketable. Then the loan 
repayments can be deducted frcsn payout to farmers. This applies to crops 
such as coffee, tea, pjrethrum, and'-
(
cotton. Under the right ecological and 
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product demand conditions loans could be made to farmers for any crop, but 
on the security of a non-locally marketable crop. (This idea is presently 
being tried out in Kenya, with cotton as the security crop). Otherwise it 
is probably better to subsidise the cost of essential and expensive inputs. 
The subsidy could be limited to iae smallest farmers and for limited 
periods. The undoubted expense of such an approach should be weighed against 
a credit programme with a high rate of default. 
to summarise, the importance of credit programmes for smallholders 
can be blown out of proportion. It cannot be considered equitable develop-
ment to persuade a small farmer to saddle himself with a burden oi debt 
that is not necessary. An extension service devoted to raising output 
without emphasis 011 the importance of expensive inputs would better meet 
their needs. Second, where credit is directed at poorer farmers special 
safeguards must be built in to the programme to make sure they get it. 
Third, where repayment rates are low, the deliberate provision of subsidy 
would distribute assistance with more-- precision than the .unintended provision 
of subsidies to defaulters, 
1 
4. Land Tenure Policy. | 
a) The Policy Background. ' 
Ever since the publication of the Swynnerton Plan in 1954? 
individualisation of land tenure has been accepted as a cardinal principle 
of land policy in Kenya. The argument then was that customary tenure was 
a major obstacle to rapid agricultural development in the African sector 
of the economy. Two primary defects : were listed. Firstly it was claimed 
that the structure of customary.tenure encouraged the acquisition of frag-
mented holdings, and incessant litigation. Both of these were said to be 
bad for agricultural development in that a great deal of labour time was 
L 
lost in moving from one fragment to., the next^ and further that so much in-
security was caused by the factor of litigation that it was impossible to 
raise credit for or make long term investments in agriculture. Secondly it 
was also claimed that customary inheritance procedures often led to sub-
division of holdings thus leading rapidly to units of sub-economic sizes, 
(see Heyer et.al. Chapter 7, (7)). 
Individualisation was expected to cure these ills firstly by 
rationalising the structure oi the tenure sjrstem. and location of holdings 
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such. i2ia4"'faim planning, more efficient use of labour and proper diffusion 
of technical information by extension staff would be possible, Further, 
such rationalisation was expected to eliminate litigation thus reincreasing 
.tenurial security. Security would then be guaranteed through registration 
and the issue of title deeds. The ultimate pay-off to the farmer was 
expected to be an ability to raise credit on the security of his holding. 
It is important to stress that to a very large extent the • : 'i 
Swynnerton Plan and later the post-independence government saw individualisa-
tion per se as capable of generating these advantages. Thus as late as 
1966. it was being asserted that 
(for a significant number of farmers, registration and where 
appropriate consolidation of their holdings stimulates 
increases in efficiency and output far out of proportion 
to the cost of the process, (see Development Plan 1966-70) 
para 8, p.324 (5)). 
Thus' individualisation was seen as pre-reqaisite to rapid agricultural 
development in Kenya. 
b) Individualisation of tenure and SIPP 
At the time when 8±DE was launched, therefore, individualisation 
of tenure was already in progress on a large scale in most parts of the 
country. Project manuals of SIIDP, thus accepted it as a 'supporting 
programme
1
 the completion of which was fundamental to the success of most 
of the experiments which were to be initiated under the former. 
The manner in which SIGDP was implemented, however, did not permit 
this intimate inter-action. In the first instance the choice of experi-
mental areas did not take this pre-requisite into account at all. Of the 
six areas chosen, only in Tetu and Vihiga was the tenure reform programme 
complete before SiiDP was launched. And of the remaining four, only in 
Migori was the programme complete during the'first four years of SHU?, 
Indeed to this date the programme has not b e e n e-amplete in most sections 
of. Kwale
r
 I,There and Kapenguri-a Siing areas. The practical implication of 
this, was that many of the agricultural experiments in SIuJP had to be 
undertaken essentially on the basis of traditional tenure, Th±z would not 
have produced any cause for alarm had it not been for the fact that many 
aspects of the 3x210? package e«g. the issue of credit, arm planning assistance, 
/ -/ • • 
/ • ' ' , 
/ 
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and tlie• delivery of extension advice, were designed and administered on the 
assumption that individualtsation had been completed in these areas. One 
result, of this was a great deal of unevennes in the distribution of these 
resources both as between SEEP areas and within them as well. For example 
it was not unusual for the AFC (the major small-scale aid organisation) 
to deal exclusively with registered landholders rather than with the vast 
I 
majority of farmers who needed credit just as badly as the others. Similarly 
i 
farm planning and extension service staff paid little attention to those 
£reas where the tenure reform programme was incomplete. The;/ rather preferred 
/to work with registered holders eventhough as we argue below the actual 
selection of beneficiaries was based more on social status and similar criteria 
than the fact of registration alone-. 
Secondly, no active steps were taken to involve tenure reform 
personnel in SrffiP work especially to " ^ ^ h e m with the basic objectives 
of the experiment and the relevance of tenure to its viability. As a 
result there were cases such as in Mbere and Kapenguria, where forms of 
tenure inappropriate to land use patterns recommended in 3BDP project 
manuals, were being pushed aggressively by-tenure reform personnel to the 
great dismay of SIUDP personnel.. Thus individual titles were being granted 
in areas obviously suitable for group title. The result according to SiiUP 
personnel in Mbere, was almost universal failure of group ranches in the 
area. 
Thirdly, and more importantly the assumption that individualisation 
was necessary to the type of experimentation envisaged by SSDP operated in 
m,any cases to defeat one of the most cardinal aims of the programme namely 
equitable_J?i.atribution of resources among' the peasantry. The problems here 
r/ere basically inherent tb the processes of land tenure reform itself. 
The first related to the question of the issue of credit and farm planning 
^informa^tion already alluded to above. Experience has shown that title alone 
i » 
'has never tpaen. regarded as a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
delivery of these services. Research on the behaviour of credit institutions, 
iad extension stalf shows quite clearly' that the 'progressive farmer' 
approach is still vei-j much the norm. ( L e o n a r d ( 9 ) ) , Thus those benefitting 
from these services have--t,
e
nded to be the better educated, more highly placed 
and influential members of thb ^Tinmunity. In the context ef-SBIiP this came 
<ytrt?-£aieljr-c3:early. I n - K w a l o , t h 6 & e who were chosen^tTo-spearhead 
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3BDP experiments were not title deed holders per se. More Importantly they 
represented the top quantile of rural society in the district. SEEP areas 
being very high service areas, the benefits drawn by these so-called 'pro-
gressive. farmers Lhare. therefore tended to be.much, greater than in non-SEIIP' 
areas. 
The second problem related, to the question of the structure of 
land distribution resulting from tenure reform. Without seeking to amplify 
the phenomenon, it can now be asserted with some truth that the processes 
of tenure reform (i.e. adjudication, consolidation and registration) have 
led to concentration of land rights into very few hands and in many cases 
t h u has been accompanied by expansion of holdings by what might be described 
simply as the 'rural bourgeoisie'. The phenomenon of concentration of land 
rights was foreseen by Swynnerton, but he regarded it as a 'normal' occurence 
in development. Although it is clear that social and cultural attachments 
to land have combined to mitigate the rigours of individual ownership, in 
the context of S?J)P, these may breakdown much faster than in non-ox J)P areas. 
The effect is that actual (as opposed to potential) landlessness was in 
fact beginning to emerge in Tetu, Vihiga and to a lesser degree Migori, 
The expansion of holdings on the other hand was accompanied by stratification 
and the accumulation of economic and political resources inxo very few hands. 
The cumulative effect was clearly a paradox; that rather than providing a 
basis for an experiment in equitable distribution of resources, the.Shin? 
was beginning to form a basic for the conoolidation of po.ver in rural society, 
c) Corrective Measures and policies . 
The most important conclusion that may be drawn from the aforegoing 
analysis is that the ability of individual tenure to generate development 
cannot simply be assumed. In the context of SiiUP there should have been 
a re—examination of the traditional economic arguments about the role of 
tenure in agriculture particularly since there was no uniform tenurial 
system to operate from. Consequently 3IU2P personnel should have been more 
open to experimentation with a wide variety of tenurial fcrms in an attempt 
to evolve an optimum set of relationships between the two, 
Secondly lack of inter-departmental co-operation was clearly a 
factor -limiting any possible impact of tenure on ShEP experiments. In 
this arespect W<S>
n
nave suggested exo^ -.viioire (OirtrtVw-O^sndo (.TJQ)). that tenure' 
\ \ • \ 
\ 
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reform personnel should have been brought under SitDP management. For i£ 
anything is certain from available data, it is the fact that tenure reform 
personnel had completely lost sight of the original raison de'tre of that 
exercise and were treating it as just one other administrative duty t. at had to 
be completed. 
Unless these situations could be evolved, it was in our view 
disastrous to base specific projects on a tenurial form which either did not 
exist in the experimental areas, or whose alleged peculiar merits had not 
really been tested. 
5. Planning; Decentralisation 
(a) The Administrative Objective 
One of the earliest objectives of S.S.D.P. was "to establish 
procedure and techniques for accelerated and self-generating rural develop-
ment which can be repeated in other similar areas and in particular, to 
improve the developmental capacity of Kenya Government Officials in the 
field".* This objective was clearly an administrative one pointing at the 
need to design planning and implementation procedures that would facilitate 
"accelerated" development by providing an opportunity to utilise local r 
resources, including the administrative personnel. Thus the latter would have 
a chance to improve their "developmental capacity" as managers of rural 
development projects. 
i The above objective could only be achieved through some form of 
decentralisation, other-wise it was meaningless to talk about "self-generating
5
' 
rural development when the institutional arrangements v/ere such that the 
periphery did not have a chance to exhaust its potential, in planning and 
implementation. Further still the objective implied without necessarily 
quaranteeing, a high degrefe of local participation; that is to say the latter 
had to be consciously planne^ and datered for as a prerequisite for "self-
generating" development. This\had to^be done otherwise the local potential 
would never be known, except superficially, and hence it would be difficult 
* See Leach (8). Mr, leach\was co-orflinator of Hural Development 
Projects in the Kenya Ministry of Finance and" Planning from 1963 - 73. 
** See for example Leach, Told 3 6 1 - 6 2 
- 16 - IDS/vO? 296 
to assess either the degree of "acceleration" or the degree of "self-generation
1 
Ability to assess the two latter aspects is especially important in an e 
experimental programme like S.R.D.P., otherwise there would not be any criteria 
except at the level of abstract principles ana objectives, for judging the 
results of the experiment. 
(b) The Administrative Structures and Functions 
What then were the administrative features of S.R.D.P. and did they 
indicate intention to decentralise? The latter question is raised because some 
people have argued that S.R.D.P. was never intended as an experiment in 
decentralisation.** The main administrative features of S.R.D.P. were the 
"Lihkman", the Area Co-ordinator and the Programming and Implementation 
Management System. (PIM) 
The Tankmeh were created as "representatives" of S.R.D.P. in each 
relevant ministry since S.R.D.P. field operations involved a number of 
ministries. Their main job was to provide interministerial coordination. 
The Area Co-ordinator had the function of coordinating S.R.D.P. activities. 
There was one Area - Coordinator in each S.R.D.P. area. These posts were 
filled by District Officers from the Office of the President. The Prog-
ramming ana Implementation Management System had the following basic features 
1, A project committee which met three times a year and whose main function 
as suggested by its composition, was to facilitate local participation by 
involving local people in project selection and identification of local 
resources, among other things, 2, Informal meetings between Area Coordinators 
and S.R.D.P. staff. 3. Annual Implementation and Evaluation Review, 
4, An Annual Programming Exercise, 5. An Annual Estimate Exercise and 
6, An Annual Re-plan and Submission of new Proposals. P.I.M. was no doubt 
the most important feature of S.R.D.P. administration and it was intended 
to serve the following purposes, (see Chabala et,al. (3)). 
1, to improve and focus information flows between field and headquarters 
2, to increase co-ordination between sectoral ministries in the field 
3, to raise the level of commitment of divisional officers to the programme 
4, to provide for more effective control over the performance of divisional 
staff* 
See for example Leach, Ibid 361-62 
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5. to create mechanisms of collegial control among divisional officers 
6. to encourage divisional officers to make demands upon headquarters where 
necessary for programme implementation. 
7. to improve the general understanding of officers at all levels of the 
steps and timings involved in the implementation process. 
9. to give the area coordinator a tool that would help him to both define 
and perform M s job. 
The intended functions of P.I.M. clearly show that the original 
idea was' to put the emphasis, not on the headquarters at Nairobi but on the 
field. The focus on officers at the Divisional level indicates that this 
was the level at which "the developmental capacity of Kenyan Govt. Officials 
in the field" wa.s to be created, Furthermore, if we take into account the 
existence of the Project Committee, and Area Co-ordinator as integral parts 
of P.I.M. It soon becomes clear that both decentralisation and local 
participation were conscious intentions of S.R.D.P. administration. This 
conclusion is not only justified on the basis of inference from S.R.D.P. 
administrative structures, but also on the basis of what the government 
intended to happen. The latter is partly indicated by the governments terms 
or reference for the first overall evaluation of S.R.D.P. by the research 
staff of the Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi, The 
terms of reference included, inter alia, the following items (S.R.D.P..(13), 
p. IS): 
1, In planning- the S.R.DP., was the unexploited potential for 
development of each 3RDP areas adequately assessed? 
2 , Y/ere the probable constraints preventing this potential from 
being maximally exploited adequately assessed? 
3, Are the implementation stages effective enough to try out 
(these) new strategies and approaches? 
4 , How effective hap: the role of the Area Co-ordiaators, District 
Development Committees and Ministry of Finance & Development 
in its capacity of\ overall SRDP Co-ordinator been? 
\ V 
5, To what extent haveVthe local communities been adequately involved 
in the planning and implem.ep.tat ion of 3RBP and to wha±_sxtent has 
this involvement been premature, timely or too late? —--
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(c) The Field Performance: 
What then actually happened to S.R.D.P. in terms of the institu-
tional and other intentions to decentralise decision-making and thereby 
create local capacity to generate and sustain development through local 
participation? Par-reasons too numerous to list in full, S.R.D.P. did not 
materialise into he experiment in decentalisation that it was intended to be 
(S.R.D.P. (l4)j Chapter 19). The following are just some of the reasons: 
1, For a number of reasons, the "Linlouen'' system did not work 
uniformly well. One of these reasons was that some of the 
lihkmen had other responsibilities and had had no field 
experience in rural administration. 
/ 
2, The Area Co-ordinator did not have sufficient authority and 
therefore could not commit himself to binding decisions, Laek 
of authority to Incur Ecpenfiiture, in particular had severe 
consequences especially in terms of creating local commitment. 
In addition, the Area Co-ordinator had limited financial 
information and this made it possible for some ministries to 
"borrow" _ money from B.Ii.D.P. to take care of fiscal crises in 
other divisions or districts, 
* 
3, The Project Committees remained purely advisory. As a result 
their meetings were not well attended and in general they were 
not taken seriously. In some places where they were taken 
seriously e.g. Vihiga, they were seen as a forum for local 
notables'to make their demands and in effect "the;'' became" a 
device for formal ccoptation of local leadership, with the 
real decision^ being made by a smaller group" . 
4-. The P.I.M. system was never fully accepted by the Provincial 
and District Commissioners, since the latter seemed to prefer 
the conventional reporting system. The result was that this 
reduced the potential utility of P.I.Ii. as a prototype for 
districtplanning in the future. It is quite possible that 
the Provincial and District -00110133ioners were .afraid' .of the 
power inherent in the possession of =>yat«iaatic data at the 
divisional level, this despite the original eiupna«xs mi th© 
division as the S„R.D.P. administrative Unit. 
p 
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(d) Corrective Measures; - Ccmaitment. 
These reasons and most of the others enumerated in the Evaluation 
reveal that they are by and large institutional/administrative reasons which 
are, ipso facto, descriptive and not explanatory. They are descriptive 
because, the failure of decentralisation and participation to take place 
could not have been a direct result of institutional/administrative short-
comings of 3.E.D.P. since as we have seen, most of he administrative structures 
pointed towards substantial decentralisation. The explanation of the failure 
seems to lie in the fact that decentralisation and consequently local parti-
cipation cannot be a simple function of institutional manipulations. There 
must be in addition what one might call an ethic of participation and this 
ethic must be systematic. As it is, this ethic seems to have been lacking 
on the part of the Central Administrators in Nairobi, Thus, despite the 
presence of administrative structures, and a commitment to local participation 
by the field administrators like the Area Co-ordinator, participation and 
meaningful decentralisation did not take place. 
The failure can also be accounted for by the fact that the conceivers 
of S.R.D.P., in this case the central administrators and foreign donors were 
not prepared to accept the equity implications of decentralisation and 
participation, .Meaningful decentralisation must lead to access to resources 
by the olocal community, as a result of having power to take part in decision 
relating to resources. Hopefully this access would lead to a development 
of high stakes in the development activities and this would in turn lead to 
participation either with the intentions of preserving the status quo or 
changing it. One of course, does not want to deny the fact that decentralisa-
tion might have negative equity implications especially where there are vast 
regional inequalities in terms of resources endowment. Decentralisation, 
however, does not necessarily mean complete autonomy thereby institutional-
ising Regional inequalities that might exist. It does mean, however, that 
i 
the periphery should get a chance to enter into a consultative arrangement 
with the centre in order to jointly decide on the question of resources 
distribution. This, of course, oalls for a commitment on the parts of both 
I 
the centre and the periphery, to the notion of fair distribution. This 
ccmmitment is a function of political orientation and without it administrative 
structures, no matter how decentralised, are likely to be inadequate. 
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6. Conclusions 
This brief paper can hardly claim-to'have"treated adequately all 
that has been learnt from the Kenyan SEDP. Nevertheless
?
 enough has been 
said to make it clear" that it is not an easy matter to ensure that rural 
development reaches all sections of the community,, It is not simply a 
matter of guarding against the appropriation of development benefits by 
local vested interests but also of discarding experts cherished notions 
of the right way to pursue development goals. The magnitude and persistence 
of these obstacles requires that to overcome them there must be a firm and 
consistent commitment by government at both the national and local levels, 
otherwise the pattern of development will lapse into the old tendency toward 
inequality. 
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